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Introduction 
In conventional dispute resolution procedures, assistance from third parties, whether they 
be public dispute resolution agencies or independent facilitators, usually arises several 
steps into the procedure where deadlock has arisen. This has long been viewed as a key 
principle of voluntary collective bargaining in which the parties are expected to take 
primary responsibility for their mutual dealings and for striving to reach settlements in 
negotiations or disputes before seeking assistance from third parties (Steadman 2003). 
The ‘classic triad’ of dispute resolution activities, conciliation, mediation (often taken to 
mean a more directive style of conciliation in which proposals may be put to the parties 
by the third party) and arbitration, pivot around this principle (EIRO 2006; Valdes Dal- 
Re 2003; Welz & Kauppinen 2005).  
One significant strand of innovation in conflict management involves turning this 
principle on its head by involving third parties at or close to the outset of negotiations, 
with a view to avoiding deadlock and encouraging agreement. State dispute resolution 
agencies and private facilitators now sometimes provide facilitation of this type. They 
can also act at the behest of Labour Courts or other adjudication bodies, in effect 
overseeing a return by the parties in dispute to direct talks in search of settlement. 
In the UK, Acas conducts ‘assisted bargaining’ and describes the process as early 
assistance to the parties involved in collective industrial relations issues, with a view to 
preventing a dispute arising. In assisted bargaining the outcomes of negotiations remain 
in the hands of the parties, the role of Acas being to facilitate the parties in arriving at 
mutually acceptable solutions. In such circumstances an Acas facilitator might chair 
negotiations. Assisted bargaining tends to occur in cases where there is a history of 
disputes (Acas 2009: 4). A review of 25 years of Acas’s activities portrayed assisted 
bargaining or ‘advisory mediation’ as a process that was normally concerned with less 
urgent longer-term issues and thus more likely to be seen as ‘more preventive or strategic 
than dispute mediation’ (Goodman 2000: 38). It was observed that the distinction 
between assisted bargaining and conciliation was not clear-cut. In some instances 
initiatives such as the creation and chairing by Acas of ‘joint working parties’ to handle 
longer-term strategic issues might be an extension of conciliation, especially if 
undertaken against the background of a potential dispute or as part of a conciliation 
settlement (Goodman 2000: 38). In practice there was ‘some flexible blurring of 
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activities’ at the interface between conciliation and advisory mediation or assisted 
bargaining (Goodman 2000: 32).  
The International Labour Organization (ILO) identifies ‘facilitated negotiation or assisted 
bargaining’ as a form of ADR that is less commonly used internationally than other ADR 
practices. The ILO defines the process as the use of independent third parties that 
facilitate a negotiation process before any dispute has arisen. The facilitator uses chairing 
and mediation skills and, with the permission of the parties involved, can hold private 
meetings with each as part of the facilitation process. The process is sometimes preceded 
by negotiation skills training and a pre-negotiation meeting (Steadman 2003). In the case 
of public service dispute resolution, the ILO advocates ‘active facilitation’ in the pre-
bargaining phase of negotiations that might involve multiple unions, with possibly 
conflicting bargaining priorities (Thompson 2010: 25). Facilitated negotiations are also 
presented as a form of positive dispute prevention rather than reactive dispute resolution, 
where pre-emptive steps can be undertaken by the facilitator to shape bargaining 
dynamics from the outset (Thompson 2010: 31).  
The ILO observes that assisted bargaining can be facilitated by independent professionals 
or by state agencies involved in conflict resolution. Another agency providing assisted 
bargaining is the South African Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
(SACCMA) The SACCMA is available to assist parties involved in restructuring 
negotiations at the outset of their mutual engagement and can provide a route to gaining 
agreement on a protocol for engagement. The facilitator also chairs negotiations 
(Thompson 2010: 31).  
Collective bargaining that has not become bogged down in disputes or conflict is also 
facilitated by the US Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. The FMCS can assist 
employers and unions by providing mediation from the outset when contracts are open 
for renegotiation and also by convening and facilitating dialogue and negotiations 
involving public service employers and unions (as well as other parties) (FMCS 2012; 
Thompson 2010: 32). ‘Proactive labour-management facilitation’ by the FMCS is 
equated mainly with the provision of joint training for partnership initiatives (Cohen 
2010). However, following the advent of the Great Recession, the FMCS’s role as 
proactive facilitator broadened into a ‘new model for managing labour-management 
conflicts’ (Cohen 2011). This new model included the provision of joint training, as 
3 
 
before, but extended into a series of additional modes of mediation. These included 
convening seminars on good practice in joint problem-solving and early contract 
(re)negotiation; facilitating partnership structures and arrangements; being available to 
parties in instances where intense conflicts were anticipated or had arisen; early 
involvement in areas of the public sector, such as education, where reform programmes 
were being implemented to provide both training and facilitation to support interest-
based bargaining (Cohen 2011).  
The well understood problem of distinguishing in practice between different forms of 
dispute resolution, the blurred interfaces between modes of third-party involvement and 
the fact that ‘diversity prevails over homogeneity’ in different dispute resolution systems, 
makes it difficult to portray trends in the field, particularly in Europe, where the problem 
is compounded by different legal systems and traditions (Valdes Dal-Re 2003: 14; Welz 
& Kauppinen 2005). Some commentators hold that developments like more intense 
international competition, new forms of work organization and greater involvement by 
unions in company decision-making are leading to a growing reliance on the ‘classic 
triad’ of dispute resolution activities as against the judicial determination of disputes 
(Valdes Dal-Re 2003) or to a greater emphasis on co-operation over confrontation 
(Brown 2014). Brown (2014) has noted in this context that in the Anglo-American world 
dispute resolution agencies have been devoting more resources to promoting better 
industrial relations. With respect to assisted bargaining specifically no trends are 
identified. In the US it has been observed that ‘interest-based bargaining’ has gained 
widespread use in the private and public sectors, with the result that mediators or 
facilitators, whatever their provenance, have had to become skilled in facilitating this 
process, as well as in conciliating in more traditional adversarial or positional bargaining 
(Kochan & Zack 2013: 171).  
Facilitation in interest-based bargaining is seen to involve the combined use of mediation 
processes and tactics to educate and guide the parties through stages of standard problem- 
solving with a view to reaching agreements that better serve the interests of the parties 
than traditional compromise-oriented processes (Kochan & Zack 2013: 175). Barrett & 
O’Dowd (2005: Ch. 6) identify a series of core features of facilitation in interest-based 
bargaining, drawing on their experience as facilitators in the US and Ireland. As in 
conventional conciliation the facilitator needs to be seen at all times as neutral and to 
demonstrate independence and integrity so that trust can be established with the parties. 
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More distinctive however are the roles adopted by facilitators in the bargaining process. 
Having established the parties’ expectations, facilitators might conduct information and 
training workshops in which the parties establish ground rules and practical arrangements 
surrounding negotiations. During negotiations facilitators assist with problem-solving 
and in addressing process difficulties. Parties may need assistance to identify interests, 
generate options and to agree the criteria for assessing options. Finally, the parties might 
seek assistance from the facilitator in drafting documents in which agreements are 
recorded and in subsequently evaluating the bargaining process (Barrett & O’Dowd 
2005: 91–5). It is clear from Barrett & O’Dowd’s account that, although facilitators in 
interest-based bargaining may be proactive in informing and assisting parties with respect 
to bargaining principles, stages and techniques, they generally adopt a non-directive style 
of mediation.  
While facilitation and assisted bargaining have attracted interest and commentary, 
especially as distinctive mediation processes that may be growing more common in 
response to secular trends in the economic and business environment, few empirical 
studies exist internationally of assisted bargaining and the role of third parties in 
facilitating the bargaining process in this manner.  
The Labour Relations Commission brokers agreements between employers and unions in 
both conventional ways and through a process that is called ‘facilitation’ and that 
includes assisted bargaining as understood in the literature. This chapter[paper/section?] 
examines the role of the LRC in assisted bargaining, supported by the comments of 
facilitators and by case studies of instances of assisted bargaining. Drawing on eight 
interviews with industrial relations officers with experience of facilitation and often of 
assisted bargaining, it begins with an examination of the LRC’s broader facilitation 
function and then examines the specific third-party processes involved in assisted 
bargaining as a mode of facilitation.  
Interviews with all those who had experience of assisted bargaining focused on the 
following areas: 
 The circumstances in which organizations and unions seek assistance from third 
parties. 
 The processes involved in assisting the parties to collective bargaining. 
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 The challenges involved in facilitating the parties to reach agreement. 
 The objectives of the parties in seeking assistance and the outcomes attained. 
 Views on trends in the use of assisted bargaining by organizations and unions. 
Facilitation  
Within the LRC, support to employers and unions early in the process of negotiation is 
provided as part of a more general set of activities known as ‘facilitation’. The LRC has 
engaged in some 30–40 instances of facilitation each year in recent years. The overall 
incidence of facilitated bargaining remains modest in the context of a case-load of over 
1,000 referrals to conciliation in 2011, although, as will become clear, facilitation can 
arise in significant employments and involve major incidents and complex change and 
reorganization programmes.  
A broad spectrum of employers and issues provides the focus for facilitation. Both large 
prominent firms and small employers have been supported, as have organizations in the 
private and public sectors. Facilitation agendas can range from single issues to complex 
multifaceted issues or relationship problems of a basic character. In some instances 
facilitation is provided in disputes about union recognition, or in firms where unions are 
not recognized. 
Facilitation, as provided by the LRC, was described by a senior officer as ‘extra 
procedural’ in nature: that is parties avail of this form of assistance in circumstances 
where either one or both do not wish to enter or engage with standard disputes 
procedures, which might either be predicated on union recognition, or involve steps or 
stages culminating in LRC conciliation, Labour Court hearings, or equivalent procedural 
stages in public service organizations. Parties may also avail of facilitation where all 
stages of procedures have been exhausted and where problems or disputes nevertheless 
remain partially or wholly unresolved. Facilitation may also be extra-procedural in the 
sense of it being availed of by groups outside the formal jurisdiction of the LRC and the 
Labour Court.  
Extra-procedural support involving facilitation has been offered and along a spectrum 
marked at one extreme by explorations surrounding issues in contention or disputes over 
union recognition, and at the other by support for parties who had exhausted all 
procedural steps or for groups not strictly within the formal jurisdiction of the LRC.  
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At one end of the spectrum were instances where facilitation involved exploring ways of 
dealing with complex and sensitive disputes, such as liability for funding redundancy 
payments. In one such instance, involving a high-profile public institution, the parties 
‘needed some way to have a conversation without it going anywhere or getting out into 
the public domain’. The facilitation process resulted in an outcome that satisfied the 
parties and avoided reputational damage to the institution involved. Other complex and 
technical disputes addressed by means of facilitation included industrial relations issues 
arising around transfers of undertakings. 
Also at this end of the spectrum were instances where facilitation was availed of where 
employers had refused to concede recognition and disputes had arisen either around the 
issue of recognition, or surrounding terms and conditions of employment in firms without 
union recognition. An example involved a services business engaged in a bitter 
recognition dispute that had led to work stoppages. The LRC offered its services to the 
parties to facilitate a solution through bilateral contacts and meetings, aware that inviting 
the parties to conciliation would meet with rejection from the employer as it would have 
been viewed as tantamount to negotiating with the union and hence recognition. In a case 
such as this, firms could ‘still stand over their reluctance to engage with unions by 
engaging through the mediator with the union’. In another instance unionized staff in a 
number of outlets operated by a multinational firm simply sought the resolution of a 
dispute over changes to terms and conditions of employment. Facilitation was offered 
and involved the parties occupying separate rooms in the same building, with the 
facilitator acting as a go-between (this process was referred to in media reports as 
‘proximity talks’). In other disputes where unions are not recognized, however, the 
parties might demur from meeting a facilitator in the same building or even in the same 
town. 
In another case of a non-union firm a dispute arose over severance terms. When the firm 
announced its intention to shift activities to another country employees formed a working 
group to protest the severance terms on offer. Their militant and determined leadership 
sought the assistance of the LRC. Senior management in the parent company were 
contacted and readily agreed to enter a facilitation process. Through intensive efforts on 
the part of the facilitator, satisfactory revised terms were agreed and accepted. Here 
facilitation had secured the ‘peaceful departure of a company’ on terms acceptable to all 
involved.  
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At the other extreme of the facilitation spectrum were circumstances where the parties 
had exhausted all steps in a disputes procedure and were assisted to resolve remaining 
differences by moving beyond the reach of the formal agreed procedure. Instances 
included a public agency in which a dispute had been subject to Labour Court 
recommendations but remained unresolved. In the shadow of a high-stakes threatened 
strike and other forms of protest by staff, the LRC, having explored the ‘situation on the 
ground’, facilitated an intensive process that agreed a framework for settling the dispute. 
Another case involved a claim for re-grading that had been the subject of a Rights 
Commissioner hearing. Legislation dictated that the substantive issue, which remained 
unresolved, could not return to conciliation. The parties agreed to facilitation and a 
solution was arrived at. Employers and unions operating within the Croke Park or 
Haddington Road agreements had also sometimes sought and obtained assistance outside 
of formal dispute resolution procedures that might have led them through prescribed 
dispute resolution stages, ending in binding arbitration. 
Extra-procedural support was also provided at different points within or along this 
spectrum. The most common instances arose where firms and unions were parties to 
conventional disputes procedures but wished to engage outside the context of those 
procedures and avoid finding themselves on a ‘tramway to the Labour Court’. In some 
such instances, particularly in larger firms, familiarity with the work of the LRC and the 
experience of key managers and union officials with the time-lines and challenges 
involved in significant restructuring programmes were considerations in their seeking 
assistance to engage outside formal disputes procedures. 
In other circumstances conventional conciliation, in the words of one person, 
‘transmogrified’ into facilitation when it emerged at conciliation that the immediate issue 
in dispute, for example, plans to make people redundant, reflected deeper underlying 
problems that might benefit from facilitated engagement around multiple issues. In these 
situations ‘conciliation [could] meld into facilitation’ in a process that was seen to have 
the ‘inherent flexibility to adapt as the dialogue evolved’: 
As you get into [conciliation] it broadens out into a wider, deeper 
facilitative exercise to allow the parties to consider things in the round 
and to broaden and deal with their agendas in a facilitated environment, 
rather than [their being confined to] a specific dispute situation. 
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Conciliation might also trigger facilitation in a more confined manner, such as in the case 
of a private hospital where the employer and union entered conciliation to resolve a 
dispute over a change to conditions of employment. The person responsible for 
conciliating took the initiative and shifted the basis on which the dispute was being 
addressed: 
I came up with a solution for them that gave them breathing space to try 
to sort it out. Basically it involved setting up a joint working party to 
review the whole [thing] and clarify for the workers what was involved. 
The union said to me ‘would you chair that, facilitate that?’ … . They 
just left me to do it with a small group of local managers and shop 
stewards. It went very well and, as it turned out, I think they resolved it 
after the first meeting.  
As practised by the LRC, facilitation emerges then as a very flexible mode of dispute 
resolution and sometimes of dispute prevention. Drawing on the spectrum of 
circumstances in which the LRC has become involved, Box 12.1 seeks to categorize the 
main modes of facilitation employed by the LRC. To begin with there is what might be 
termed ‘exploration and informal diplomacy’. Here, as in cases of disputes surrounding 
union recognition, or in firms where recognition had been withheld, the facilitation 
process may be tentative and cautious, and the parties may refuse to engage face-to-face, 
or even to meet with LRC officers in the same building or location. Also included in this 
category are instances of facilitation where the focus is on establishing what issue(s) are 
in dispute or who the parties to a dispute actually are, as in the case of the public service 
organization dealing with redundancies, where liability for payments was unclear and 
subject to dispute.  
Next are activities where facilitation is provided in the shadow of adjudication by 
agencies like the Rights Commissioners or the Labour Court. The LRC acts to broker 
settlements, taking account of the positions of adjudicating agencies. Here, brokerage 
activity is more directive and the parties engage face-to-face and in side-conferences in a 
process that is typically highly directive and controlled by the facilitator. Finally, as will 
be discussed at length in the next section, there are facilitation activities that involve 
‘assisted bargaining’, as this process is commonly understood in the international 
literature. Here, the LRC facilitates engagement between employers and unions outside 
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the context of a dispute. As will emerge, facilitation tends to be less directive than in 
conventional conciliation or in what has been described as brokerage in the shadow of 
adjudication. Without the immediate pressures of finding a settlement for a dispute, the 
time horizon over which issues might be addressed can be longer than pertains to other 
circumstances where facilitation is provided. 
Box 12.1 Modes of Facilitation 
 
Exploration and Informal Diplomacy: Facilitation is non-directive and mainly 
involves exploratory sounding or talks and possibly cautious and tentative dealings 
with parties, particularly employers. The standard operating procedures of 
conciliation are suspended in favour of informal offers of assistance to one or both 
parties. Facilitation may be conducted mainly by phone or email. The parties may 
have no direct dealings with each other and fail to agree to meet simultaneously in the 
same building, or even to engage with the facilitator in the same location. Proposals 
for settlements are understood to emanate from the facilitator. 
 
Brokerage in the Shadow of Adjudication: Facilitation mainly involves directive 
conciliation and is conducted in the shadow of a recommendation by the Labour 
Court or decision by a Rights Commissioner, or by suspending adjudication pending 
direct engagement between the parties. Mandate to seek solution to dispute takes 
account of the position of adjudication bodies. 
 
Assisted Bargaining: Facilitation is non-directive, oriented to a longer time horizon 
and conducted outside the context of a dispute. Bargaining agendas are often complex 
or technical in nature and the parties to bargaining commonly seek the assistance of 
an independent third-party to facilitate settlement.  
 
 
Assisted Bargaining 
This section considers in more detail the features of facilitation when practised in 
circumstances where no current dispute exists and where the parties to facilitation have 
opted to address significant issues outside of standard dispute resolution procedures.  
In the LRC the practice of assisted bargaining stretches back to the 1990s. The LRC’s 
first Director of Conciliation traced the advent of this kind of intervention to several 
significant disputes during that decade (McGee 2013). In Waterford Crystal, Aer Lingus 
and ESB, all affected by major changes in commercial conditions, two LRC officers were 
assigned to work with management and unions over periods of up to four months. In the 
case of Waterford Crystal, a strike was already underway when LRC officers were 
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assigned to assist the parties at the behest of the Minister for Labour. This dispute 
established a precedent for embedding LRC officers to work intensively over a longer 
period than usual in conventional facilitation. In Aer Lingus, where the LRC became 
involved at the behest of IBEC and ICTU, the same approach was adopted to facilitate 
complex negotiations surrounding restructuring. This time the exercise was 
‘preventative’ and work stoppages were avoided. The LRC facilitated a complex series of 
negotiations in Aer Lingus that were ‘extremely intensive and extremely long’ in a firm 
with a somewhat fractious industrial relations legacy: 
First of all there was no actual dispute comprehended at the time and in 
fact it never actually got near that situation … . There [was] a lengthy 
agenda covering all areas and the idea was to achieve a transition to a 
leaner, slimmer, more efficient airline with different work practices … .  
The facilitation process in Aer Lingus included conciliation sessions that had addressed a 
raft of difficult and contentious issues The LRC became involved in a similar capacity in 
2001 when the airline sought agreement with its unions on a survival plan. At that point 
the context was different: ‘it was much more conciliation because there was a very real 
and definite threat of action and there was a real and definite threat of the company 
closing.’ The LRC issued a detailed set of recommendations to the parties, which in 
effect involved a form of adjudication.  
In the case of the ESB, management and unions participated in a joint ‘cost and 
competitiveness review’ that was facilitated by the LRC. The process again involved 
assisting negotiations around multiple issues in the context of disjunctive commercial 
change triggered by liberalization of the energy market, instigated by the EU. The LRC’s 
involvement was at the request of the ICTU’s General Secretary, Peter Cassells, who had 
acted as an external facilitator of the cost and competitiveness review (McGee 2013: 61–
4). Another early instance of assisted bargaining arose in Irish Rail during the mid- to 
late-1990s. In this case the LRC engaged in a two-and-a-half year facilitation process 
across 33 bargaining units resulting in radical changes in work practices and working 
time arrangements in the company. Further early initiatives in facilitation were 
undertaken in Irish Sugar and Irish Ferries.  
These early instances of assisted bargaining had a number of salient features. The LRC’s 
involvement as facilitator was intensive and protracted and the parties addressed complex 
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and multifaceted restructuring challenges, often in circumstances involving radical 
commercial or regulatory changes. LRC facilitation sometimes occurred in the absence of 
a dispute. The process of facilitation sometimes included quasi-adjudication, taking the 
form of reports and recommendations issued to the parties. Some of these early features 
of assisted bargaining were to remain integral to the LRC’s subsequent work in this area. 
Assisted bargaining is defined both by circumstance and by process. The circumstances 
that shape the work of the facilitator are that no current dispute exists, pressures for a 
settlement or agreement are less acute or pressing than in conventional conciliation, or 
even other modes of facilitation, and the ensuing engagement may occur over a longer 
time-horizon. As with facilitation more generally, the parties have also opted to step 
outside of standard multi-step procedures with provision for conciliation where an 
impasse occurs, followed by adjudication by the Labour Court. The process of facilitation 
in assisted bargaining is also distinctive in significant respects but remains anchored in 
the main in standard conciliation skills.  
In the experience of LRC officers adept at assisted bargaining and modes of facilitation, 
the default skills and processes involved are very similar to those that are applied in 
conventional dispute-based conciliation. For some of those interviewed the dominant 
mode of dispute resolution provided by the LRC is ‘directive conciliation’, involving an 
‘assertive approach’, where the third party presses for a settlement and ‘heads are banged 
together’ to that end. This view is epitomized by the maxim of a former Director of 
Conciliation regarding dispute resolution in the LRC: ‘just get them fixed and out’ 
(McGee 2012:55). Facilitation, whether provided in instances where assisted bargaining 
occurs, or in other circumstances, is not then understood as being characterized by any 
distinctive or proprietary dispute resolution process or template.  
Consistent with this view, when LRC officers described their work as facilitators, the 
major activities and processes involved were represented as drawing on skills at the core 
of classical conciliation. These included communicating with the parties, identifying their 
expectations, conveying information between them, seeking out areas where compromise 
might be achieved, chairing meetings and maintaining momentum. Also prominent are 
other activities and processes, such as holding side conferences and caucus meetings with 
principals to explore problems and areas around which movement might be possible; 
prompting the parties to consider how their positions were likely to be viewed by 
12 
 
adjudication bodies such as the Labour Court; identifying areas of agreement as a basis 
for drafting ‘without status’ documents – containing proposals that formally ceased to 
have any standing if rejected by the parties – that might focus discussion and provide an 
eventual basis for settlement. Sometimes those facilitating assisted bargaining might even 
present proposals to the parties. Essentially the same values and qualities that were 
understood to be imperatives in conciliation are also seen to matter in facilitation, 
especially impartiality, trust and confidence in the facilitator. 
The interviews made clear that within the LRC little distinction is made or recognized 
between the process of facilitation, whether in instances of assisted bargaining or in other 
circumstances where facilitation occurs, and the process of conciliation. This is evident 
from the following comments by different people: ‘In my experience it’s pretty much the 
same skill set.’ ‘Very often it’s the same sort of template.’ ‘To me it’s like a variation on 
the same thing.’ ‘I see very little that’s different; the outcomes are different [in the sense 
that facilitation typically involves no onward referral into disputes procedure and 
ultimately to the Labour Court].’ ‘So you have this word “facilitation”; to me it’s the 
same thing by another name.’ ‘Who cares what it’s called.’ ‘There isn’t a qualitative 
distinction between what you would do under the heading “facilitation” and what you 
would do under the heading “conciliation”.’ ‘These are labels. I mean assisted 
bargaining, conciliation. At the end of the day it’s problem-solving.’ ‘I’d be guided by 
the needs of the parties. If the needs of the parties are for facilitation, the template is 
exactly the same.’ ‘A lot of words are used for convenience, for the optics.’ ‘A rose by 
any other name is still a rose.’ 
But the conduct of facilitation, as outlined above and in Box 12.1, was marked by a 
significant degree of process flexibility. Facilitation could be attuned to the different sets 
of circumstances in which it was offered. In the case of assisted bargaining the default 
conciliation skill-set is adjusted or transposed in a number of significant ways. These 
reflect the genesis of assisted bargaining in circumstances where one or both parties seek 
support from the LRC of a ‘more proactive’ nature because no dispute exits and no claim 
is on the table. Assisted bargaining is portrayed by some facilitators as ‘more informal’ 
than classical conciliation. It is also seen to be more intensive and often, but not always, 
more prolonged in nature than conventional conciliation and facilitation activity. The 
parties also tend to be ‘less confrontational’ in their dealings with each other. Facilitators 
tend to be ‘more relaxed’ and ‘less assertive’ in their dealings with the parties than when 
13 
 
involved in conventional conciliation because the process may be ‘less about fire-fighting 
than about prevention’: 
It immediately suggests to me something long-term … . ‘We need help 
with restructuring, rationalization, a major negotiation.’ In conciliation 
when people come in it is [about] ‘what are you prepared to do?’. From 
the ‘get-go’ it’s like ‘let’s do the business’, whereas with [this type of] 
facilitation it’s more a long-term process, [involving] more hand 
holding, bringing them along, if you like. It’s more time-consuming …. 
.  
Quite often we’re less assertive because in a dispute situation you really 
do have to press people very hard to face reality and to get a conclusion 
because we don’t have the luxury of not getting to a conclusion. 
Whereas in a facilitative exercise over a more extended time-frame ... 
you can actually allow time for parties to come together and go apart, to 
facilitate a lot more extended dialogue. The facilitator doesn’t have the 
luxury of not so much laying down the law but being quite assertive in 
the environment because you’re actually trying to facilitate people 
coming together.  
Comments by other officers with experience of facilitation in an assisted bargaining 
context also underscore the less assertive or less directive role of third parties in this 
mode of facilitation, which was also portrayed as more diffuse or ‘touchy feely… 
bordering on mediation’: 
There may be an ongoing workshop. The participants want a facilitator 
to guide them through a difficult period where they’re talking face-to-
face over a long period of time, and eventually the facilitator just fades 
into the background. … You’re literally just chairing meetings between 
the parties. 
If the parties wanted facilitation, a clinical facilitation, you may just be 
acting as chairman throughout a full process, where the parties are 
talking [and] have a set agenda. 
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Notwithstanding the less directive role of the facilitator in instances of assisted 
bargaining, compared to classical dispute conciliation, it was clear, as well, that directive 
interludes could arise in which the facilitator might seek to focus the parties and inject 
urgency into the process. Directive interludes could affect both the substance and process 
of facilitation. The facilitator might advocate the benefits of proposals on the table to one 
or other of the parties, feeling less constrained by the impartiality that needs to be 
maintained more strictly in conciliation. An example was provided of a management 
proposal in assisted bargaining talks in a pharmaceutical firm where the facilitator sought 
to ‘focus’ the unions by highlighting that the management proposal meant offering 
money rather than taking money away. Directive interludes might also seek to alter the 
pace of engagement or the urgency attaching to reaching settlement. To prevent the often 
intensive and prolonged nature of assisted bargaining becoming an obstacle in itself to a 
successful outcome, facilitators sometimes chose to become more directive by setting 
time limits to their involvement or insisting on making evidence of progress a pre-
condition for their continuing involvement. As one colleague advised another ‘tell them 
at the next meeting, they do business or you’re finished with them.’ 
The need on some occasions for directive interludes reflected a further feature of 
facilitation in assisted bargaining: the often slow and incremental nature of the process: 
‘the thing can be very frustrating because there’s an awful lot of talking; [it is] very slow 
and it can go on and on.’ This aspect of the process could be compounded where it 
involved large committees of local union representatives. This could make it ‘difficult to 
move them; it’s [a case of] small incremental steps.’  
In disputes or impending disputes short-time horizons often set parameters for 
conciliation that could be conducted ‘working against the clock’. Assisted bargaining 
outside the context of a dispute involved ‘conciliation conducted over a longer time 
frame, without as much urgency about it’. 
Otherwise, as outlined above, it was generally held that a ‘reasonably defined set of 
skills’ was deployed by facilitators, and that most of these were part of the typical 
repertoire of third parties: 
A third party assisting parties to engage with each other, or to problem-
solve, applies a reasonably defined set of skills with all the same 
ingredients around breaking down problems, isolating out the important 
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parts, facilitating people to vent and ‘paint the wall with issues’, and 
then facilitating parties to see a path forward and to isolate out what’s 
achievable and doable and helping the parties to understand what 
agreement actually is and what consensus is and what problem-solving 
is – all those kind of facilitative skills. 
A sharp contrast was made by some facilitators between the manner in which they 
assisted the parties to collective bargaining and how they understood facilitation to be 
conducted in formal interest-based bargaining. This comment however needs to be seen 
in the light of the view conveyed by a contributor to the LRC focus group reported in 
Research Paper 7, that conciliation was now commonly conducted in contexts marked by 
some of the features of interest-based bargaining, in particular parties seeking ‘win-win’ 
solutions and exchanging their understandings and aspirations in that context. 
The process of facilitation in assisted bargaining might include bilateral meetings with 
each of the parties, as occurred in conventional conciliation and in some other modes of 
facilitation. Understood as central to the conduct of assisted bargaining were core 
conciliation skills like identifying and removing ‘roadblocks’ to advance a broader 
process of engagement. A flexible approach and skill-set also extended to the provision 
of adjudication in some form as part of the facilitation process, if circumstances 
warranted.  
Parties, particularly unions, sometimes entered assisted bargaining by making it explicit 
that this was ‘without prejudice’ to their options under existing ‘normal’ dispute 
resolution procedures. The implication was that, if the process failed to deliver the 
outcomes expected, other options might be exercised down the road, while the status quo 
was also being maintained unless it was changed in the process by mutual agreement.  
Agendas and time frames in assisted bargaining tended to be set on the basis of 
employers’ objectives and time horizons: 
I’ve never had to agree terms of reference as such … . Usually what 
happens is that a company will say ‘look we’ve got to save €50 million 
or €100 million and here’s a plan’ … . They might say ‘we need 
agreement on this by the end of March or June’, whatever it might be. 
‘Can we come in and see you?’ … ‘Will you facilitate us with it?’  
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So with respect to agendas and timescales most often it was a case of ‘the company 
presents their agenda and you try to get them [the company and unions] to agree a time 
scale.’ The fact that employers’ objectives tended to frame agendas and strongly 
influence timescales still meant that facilitators played a role in gaining agreement on 
terms of reference in the straightforward sense of clarifying and gaining accord on the 
basic ground rules of the process. These included the principle that the process involved a 
‘stand-alone’ initiative, outside of normal industrial relations procedure. Early on in the 
process the facilitator might:  
Sit down and talk to the principals to ensure that they know what they 
want and that, if they don’t know what they want, you can guide them 
and you can clear up a number of issues. … You decide what your 
terms of reference are.  
Facilitators emphasized the need to maintain flexibility in the assisted bargaining process 
as matters evolved and snags or blockages arose: 
Our skill set is solution-focused. So if you’re suggesting, for example, 
that a working group may help and it’s shot down straight away that 
can then evolve into a joint training initiative where the principals on 
both sides are brought together off site and we draw up an agenda and 
we work through that agenda to the same end as a working group; but 
we’re just taking a more circuitous route.  
Agendas in assisted bargaining can range from multiple items connected with complex 
restructuring programmes to challenging single issues. An example of an assisted 
bargaining cycle involving a complex restructuring programme is provided by the 
reconfiguration of acute medical services for a population of one million people in the 
Dublin North-East region of the Health Service Executive (HSE). This is outlined in Box 
12.2. An example of assisted bargaining focused around a significant single issue is 
provided by a multinational pharmaceutical firm, where management presented unions 
with a proposal for a new framework for determining pay on a multi-annual basis linked 
with productivity. This case is outlined in Box 12.3. 
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Box 12.2 The Reconfiguration of Hospital Services in the HSE Dublin North East      
Region 
From 2007 to 2010 the Health Service Executive (HSE) implemented a Transformation 
Programme to improve healthcare delivery throughout Ireland. Among the 
‘transformation priorities’ addressed were the development of integrated services across 
all stages of healthcare, the configuration of primary, community, continuing care and 
hospital services to deliver optimal and cost effective results. 
 
These strategic priorities focused plans for the reconfiguration of healthcare delivery in 
the HSE North East Region, which straddles the counties of Louth, Meath, Cavan, 
Monaghan and North Dublin. The region serves a population of around one million 
people. The hospital service in the North East, outside North Dublin, comprised five local 
hospitals that delivered acute care to small populations. This was seen by the HSE as 
compromising service quality and patient safety. In the Louth, Meath, Cavan and 
Monaghan areas a key transformation objective involved the centralization of acute and 
complex medical care in hospitals in Drogheda and in Cavan and the provision of a series 
of day, outpatient and diagnostic services in hospitals at Dundalk, Monaghan and Navan.  
 
The HSE North East Transformation Programme involved three stages: planning, design 
and implementation and commenced in late 2007. The programme began with plans to 
reconfigure acute hospital services in the Cavan-Monaghan area. Central to these was the 
transfer of services from Monaghan hospital, which employed about 180 people, to 
Cavan. About 80 people would move to Cavan.  
 
Taking account of previous change initiatives in the health services, the management 
team resolved that all relevant information would be made available in a timely fashion 
to staff and unions with a view to preventing leaked information, media reports and 
rumours conveyed on the grapevine from disrupting progress. Managers resolved to 
address the many concerns of local staff. Clinical indicators of service effectiveness were 
discussed with professional medical staff. The area management group charged with 
implementing the reconfiguration programme was cohesive and nobody involved 
doubted the scale of the challenge they faced. The health unions were strong and 
influenced many aspects of the operational running of the hospital service. Medical 
consultants were forceful in defending their work arrangements. One of the key issues 
arising from the planned closure of accident and emergency service in Monaghan was the 
need for an effective thrombolysis service, which could stabilize heart attack victims 
prior to their being taken by ambulance to Cavan General Hospital. Considerable effort 
and training for paramedical staff went into the provision of this service in the Cavan–
Monaghan area. Work was also done on step-down facilitation, rehabilitation beds and 
the provision of a minor injuries unit at Monaghan. Plans were also developed to 
redeploy some staff into community health services. 
 
As the programme moved towards the implementation stage, managers engaged 
intensively with staff at all levels within the services and work sites affected and with the 
unions representing different categories of healthcare workers. The unions involved were 
the Services, Industrial and Professional Trade Union (SIPTU), The Irish Nurses and 
Midwives Organization (INMO), the Irish Medical Organization (IMO), the Irish 
Hospital Consultants Association (IHCA), IMPACT and the Medical Laboratory 
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Scientists Association (MLSA).  
 
Few things spark more opposition than plans to close or re-designate local hospitals and 
opposition to the proposed changes in Monaghan General Hospital was intense. Political 
lobbying surrounding the issue for some time was stepped up. Protest marches and vigils 
brought thousands onto the streets of the town, adding to pressure on the negotiators 
dealing with plans to reconfigure the hospital service. Negotiations were unsurprisingly 
difficult and highly adversarial. Relations between the parties were unavoidably affected 
by community opposition and the political controversy that ensued. With the sides 
entrenched and little movement in prospect, the principals on the union and management 
sides agreed to seek the involvement of the LRC in a facilitation capacity.  
  
The LRC first became involved in facilitating negotiations surrounding the 
reconfiguration of services in the Cavan-Monaghan hospital group on the joint invitation 
of management and unions. The parties had formed the view that they needed a third 
party to help manage and facilitate the process. The critical concerns for the unions were 
the redeployment of staff in different categories across hospital sites, as services were 
reconfigured, protecting job security and job opportunities and protecting earnings. These 
were the key areas in direct negotiations between unions and HSE management, which 
began in 2008 around plans to reconfigure services affecting Cavan and Monaghan 
hospitals. In these negotiations unions sought an overall framework for the 
reconfiguration of services that detailed the key milestones in the process and resourcing 
plans. They highlighted the need to protect posts, including promotional posts. 
Management accepted that redeployment guidelines needed to be agreed. Management 
was determined that appointments to the reconfigured services would be based on skills 
and fit with the positions to be filled rather than seniority. A guarantee of no job losses 
was provided to the unions. 
 
The LRC became involved in facilitating negotiations between the parties in early 2009 
and chaired intensive day-long negotiations based on agenda items that unions and 
management had been invited to submit. Given the number of unions involved, the union 
side in the negotiations could include up to about 20 national and local representatives. 
Among the areas addressed at the first LRC-facilitated meeting were compensation, loss 
of earnings, employment opportunities, service priorities, sequencing and timeframes and 
the principles governing redeployment. A framework document for the redeployment of 
staff was also agreed between management and unions. Redeployment would occur both 
between hospitals and between hospitals set to lose staff and all other locations within the 
HSE area. Where vacancies arose, these would in the first instance be filled through the 
redeployment of staff. The meeting also agreed a schedule of bilateral conferences 
between management and individual unions and communication processes surrounding 
the negotiations.  
 
The LRC’s involvement was constructive in facilitating the parties to engage and make 
progress. Industrial relations difficulties arose around the issues of redeployment and 
allowances. Further meetings facilitated by the LRC were held in March and April 2009. 
These addressed continuing issues surrounding redeployment and the backfilling of 
vacated posts pending the final designation of services at the hospitals. A national 
employment control framework, introduced to control staffing and pay-roll throughout 
the public service in the wake of the mounting national fiscal crisis, caused the parties 
concern. However, the transformation programme proceeded within the parameters of the 
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framework and with the blessing of key leaders on the management side.  
 
A facilitated meeting in May reached agreement on a series of areas. All staff were to be 
provided with suitable redeployment options, including redeployment to posts currently 
filled by agencies and vacated through retirement. Management undertook to investigate 
all unfilled posts across the HSE area not presented to staff for redeployment. The parties 
agreed to observe the terms of prevailing national agreements and ‘not attempt to exert 
their desired outcome pending exhaustion of the industrial relations machinery of the 
state’. Unions and management undertook to continue local discussions between the 
various categories at Monaghan and Cavan General Hospitals. Where agreement could be 
reached on issues surrounding redeployment, this was to be recorded in writing. Where 
agreement could not be reached, matters in dispute were to be referred immediately to the 
conciliation service of the LRC. Claims for compensation for loss of earnings and 
disturbance were to be referred to the LRC separately by each individual union.  
 
This ‘parallel process’ allowed the parties to proceed with redeployment activities 
without these becoming bogged down in industrial relations issues. Conciliation was 
subsequently conducted at the LRC to resolve disputes involving radiographers and 
laboratory scientists. A dispute about losses of earnings, disturbance and a diminution of 
promotion opportunities for laboratory scientists transferring from Monaghan to Cavan 
Hospitals was referred to the Labour Court. A dispute over staffing levels in Monaghan 
for non-nursing grades was referred to the LRC and then to the Labour Court, which 
nominated a facilitator to work with the parties to find a solution. 
 
The LRC next became involved in facilitating the reconfiguration of services and 
redeployment of staff between hospitals in the Louth and Meath area. Acute general 
medicine and critical care were to be concentrated at Drogheda and day and outpatient 
services to be expanded at Dundalk and Navan hospitals. These hospitals would now 
become the focus for a range of local community health services. The same detailed 
preparations and briefing processes that had been undertaken in Monaghan were 
conducted in the Louth–Meath reconfiguration programme. Local opposition was less 
marked than it had been in Monaghan.  
 
In the background to direct negotiations between management and unions was a serious 
deterioration in the national health finances. Pay cuts were implemented across the public 
service in 2009 and again in 2010. In early 2010 some public service unions declared that 
they would consider withdrawing co-operation with the health service transformation 
programme. Based on their experience of the LRC’s involvement in facilitating the 
reconfiguration of hospital services in Cavan and Monaghan, the parties agreed that the 
LRC should again facilitate negotiations. Local negotiations reflected the more difficult 
and resource constrained environment. The issue of loss of earnings again proved 
difficult and the parties sought to reach agreement on a framework for redeployment. The 
unions complained about reports in the press of contingency plans surrounding the 
transfer of acute medical services to Drogheda, about the lack of information that had 
been provided to them and also about the lack of engagement and communication with 
full-time officials. Management referred to plans for service reconfiguration being 
affected by a national shortage of non-consultant hospital doctors.  
 
In March 2010 public service unions and employers concluded the Croke Park 
Agreement. The health service sectoral agreement contained within Croke Park included 
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a provision for co-operation with the reconfiguration of the health services and the 
redeployment of staff across service locations. Under Croke Park, unresolved disputes 
were to be referred to the LRC and onward to the Labour Court for binding arbitration.  
 
The LRC facilitated a meeting in June 2010. The parties addressed the opening of a new 
emergency department at Drogheda and also plans to handle the transfer of acute medical 
services from Dundalk. At the meeting agreement was reached that management would 
hold immediate direct meetings with the unions impacted by the opening of the 
emergency department and also engage on the handling of the transfer of acute medical 
services from Dundalk to Drogheda. Management also committed to a recruitment 
process for vacant posts that would include all viable options.  
 
The LRC’s involvement in the transformation programme was intensive, involving 
around one meeting each month. The facilitation process involved a combination of 
plenary meetings, conferences with the principals and nominated representatives on both 
sides and standard conciliation meetings with the parties in separate rooms.  
 
LRC facilitation rendered engagement between the parties less adversarial and more 
productive. Facilitation provided what was described as a mode of ‘governance’ of the 
talks process. Vetoes, the issuing of threats, refusals to engage around issues or the 
leaking of information to the media were no longer acceptable within the framework 
guiding the talks. Matters better dealt with in direct negotiations between management 
and unions were handled in this manner, not overloading plenary meetings with 
inappropriate business. In a more general sense the ‘badge of the LRC’ brought resolve 
and credibility to the facilitated negotiations.  
  
In July 2009 acute on-call medical services transferred from Monaghan General Hospital 
to Cavan General Hospital. During 2010 the new accident and emergency department, 
which was three times the size of the original A&E unit, opened at Drogheda Hospital. A 
new coronary care unit was also established at the hospital in line with the 
reconfiguration of health services in the North East Region. Despite the difficult 
negotiations and highly charged protest activities in Monaghan, at no point was industrial 
action threatened or undertaken.  
 
Sources: LRC, HSE and various media reports. 
 
  
21 
 
Box 12.3 Assisted Bargaining at Wyeth/Nestlé Nutritionals 
Wyeth Nutritionals, now part of Nestlé, has manufactured infant and child nutritional 
products at its plant in Askeaton, Co. Limerick, since 1974. The plant employs about 500 
people and prior to its acquisition by Nestlé in 2012 was acquired by Pfizer in 2009. 
 
The plant is strongly unionized and the workforce is represented by different unions. 
Unite represents administrative, mechanical and electrical grades. The TEEU also 
represents staff in mechanical and electrical grades. SIPTU represents operative grades at 
the plant.  
 
In 2012 the company indicated to the LRC that they were considering appointing a 
facilitator to assist in talks with their unions on pay. The LRC offered to provide 
facilitation and an experienced Industrial Relations Officer, familiar with industrial 
relations at the plant, commenced the facilitation process in early July 2012 with the 
intention of concluding the process later that month when the plant closed for holidays. 
The process began with joint sessions with the administrative and the mechanical and 
electrical grades at which management outlined their proposed new framework for pay. 
The intention was that pay awards in future would be linked to improvements in 
productivity arising from changes in work practices. Pay increases were not to be 
discussed until the parties had agreed to changes required by management. The facilitator 
chaired sessions at which clarification of management proposals was provided and 
sought to move the process forward with the groups involved. 
 
SIPTU were not a party to the facilitation process, as they were pursuing an outstanding 
pay claim that had been the subject of a Labour Court recommendation. The Labour 
Court had recommended that the union and the firm should return to talks under the aegis 
of the LRC and the parties entered conciliation provided by the LRC’s Industrial 
Relations Officer for the region.  
 
During the facilitation process, the administrative grades and the firm came to an 
understanding in principle on a new pay framework, contingent on the other groups 
involved also agreeing.  
 
All grades involved in the facilitation process expressed concern that SIPTU was not 
involved and it became clear that agreement would not be secured until SIPTU’s ongoing 
pay dispute with the firm had been resolved. Amid these concerns, progress was delayed 
and the original deadline for facilitation expired without the process being brought to a 
conclusion. Following conciliation, the SIPTU pay claim was referred back to the Labour 
Court. Prior to the scheduled hearing by the Court, the parties held direct talks that 
resulted in an agreement providing for an 8 per cent pay increase over the period to the 
end of March 2016, plus an additional day of annual leave. 
 
Following on from the agreement with SIPTU, the company had consented to extend the 
terms agreed to grades represented by the TEEU and Unite. The groups can opt for this to 
be done through local talks or via the facilitation process. 
 
Opinion on the part of management on the facilitation process was positive. In particular, 
the process was seen to have been designed and owned by the parties, and as having been 
flexible, as distinct from the conventional dispute resolution process, where the 
22 
 
procedure is prescribed and proceeds to being owned and controlled by the LRC. 
Facilitation provided by the LRC was also seen to have enjoyed credibility by being 
independent in a way that private facilitation, paid for by the firm, could not have been.  
 
Sources: Industrial Relations News and LRC. 
 
The facilitation process in assisted bargaining sometimes involves the use of a parallel 
conciliation process. The parties may resort to conciliation and adjudication around 
proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment. This parallel approach can 
prevent the mainstream facilitation process from becoming stalled by issues that can only 
or better be addressed and resolved through conciliation. An example is provided by the 
reconfiguration of health services in HSE North East, in Box 12.2, where some issues 
were referred to conciliation to prevent the overall facilitation process from becoming 
bogged down in differences that were not amenable to resolution in the facilitation 
process. 
Reflecting on the alignment of facilitation and conciliation, a facilitator observed: 
The parties certainly found that advantageous because if you’re 
pursuing an agenda of change, you don’t want to get bogged down in 
the IR issues. You need to be able to progress these. 
People who had facilitated in the context of assisted bargaining also highlighted some of 
the challenges and problems that could arise. While one or both parties might have been 
willing to embark on the extra-procedural path represented by assisted bargaining, 
industrial relations legacies inevitably influence the process.  
A case in point is that of the pharmaceutical manufacturing firm, summarized in Box 
12.3. The union representing operatives, the largest category at the plant, pursued a claim 
for a pay rise on the grounds that this had been conceded by other plants within the firm. 
The firm sought to defend its refusal to concede the claim on the basis that a major cost 
saving and competitiveness programme at the plant had ‘absorbed’ the claim. Following 
conciliation the dispute was referred to the Labour Court. Management sought to respond 
to the claim on the basis of discussions on pay and productivity. The Court recommended 
that the parties enter joint discussions facilitated by the LRC. With a view to escaping a 
legacy of difficult industrial relations, the firm opted to seek agreement on a new 
multiannual framework for pay based on productivity by means of facilitation rather than 
conventional collective bargaining and the associated disputes procedure.  
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They became frustrated with the length of time it takes for an issue to 
proceed from local discussions through to the Labour Court because, 
inevitably, everything, no matter how big or small, ends up as a row. So 
they were looking for a mechanism to bypass the frustration.  
The industrial relations legacy was compounded by a complex bargaining structure in 
which separate unions represented general operatives, electrical crafts and combined 
mechanical, technical, engineering and administrative grades. Notwithstanding the 
Court’s recommendation, operatives at the plant sought to address the claim on its merits 
within conventional conciliation, opting to remain outside the facilitation process that had 
been engaged in by other categories at the plant. The result was a dual-track approach 
where the largest category remained within conciliation while other categories agreed to 
proceed on the basis of facilitation.  
Legacy issues could also surface in other ways in an assisted bargaining process. An 
instance was given in which unions distrusted each other and remained as reluctant to 
work together within the facilitation process as they had been in conventional collective 
bargaining. Gaining agreement from the large group of shop stewards also made progress 
difficult. In an instance involving a manufacturing firm, significant but varying progress 
had been made in facilitation with a number of categories involved. The facilitator sensed 
that management would have been prepared to allow them to arbitrate on unresolved 
matters – in effect adopting mediation–arbitration (‘med-arb’). The unions, on the other 
hand, had engaged in facilitation ‘without prejudice’ and expected to revert to normal 
industrial relations procedure (involving conciliation) if agreement could not be reached. 
Any other means of dispute resolution would have involved shop stewards relinquishing 
power, which they were not prepared to do.  
While the adoption of a dual-track process, in which some categories engaged in 
facilitation but others sought to proceed through conventional collective bargaining, 
could allow facilitation to progress, the fact that a large category opted to proceed 
through conventional collective bargaining and conciliation meant that they might ‘hold 
the cards’ with respect to the eventual success of the process. The case of the 
manufacturing firm outlined in Box 12.3 exemplifies this. In this instance a new pay 
determination framework was obviously predicated on all categories being willing to 
settle. When management and the plant’s operatives failed to resolve the long-running 
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pay dispute in conciliation, the dispute was referred back to the Labour Court. The 
facilitation process was then suspended pending the outcome of the Labour Court 
investigation. The facilitator was asked by the company to return at that point to bring the 
process to a conclusion. 
Facilitation and conciliation operating as parallel processes within assisted bargaining 
appears to present few problems, with each process reinforcing the other. An example is 
provided by the reconfiguration of hospital services in the HSE Dublin North East 
Region (see Box 12.2). Here the LRC facilitator made provision for conciliation by 
another officer on the contentious issue of loss of earnings for staff transferring between 
hospitals. What the parties referred to as the ‘parallel process’ allowed them to proceed 
with the handling of staff transfers and other aspects of service reconfiguration without 
these being bogged down by spin-off industrial relations disputes. The LRC’s facilitation 
of collective bargaining in this case helped the parties to resolve highly contentious 
issues surrounding staffing levels, new facilities and services, staff transfers between 
work sites and compensation for loss of earnings in an environment that became 
financially increasingly difficult and constrained over the period during which the 
changes were introduced. Hospital services were eventually reconfigured across five 
work sites without industrial action occurring in a process that was logistically complex 
and involved an equally complex set of negotiating issues.  
The main features of assisted bargaining, as facilitated by the LRC, are summarized in 
Box 12.4. 
Box 12.4 Features of Assisted Bargaining with Facilitation Provided by the LRC 
 No current dispute between the parties involved. 
 Proactive in addressing significant issues or multiple issues. 
 Proactive in seeking to forestall disputes. 
 Process applies core skills of classical conciliation, adjusted to facilitating 
engagement in non-dispute circumstances.  
 Longer time horizons by parties than in other forms of facilitation or conciliation and 
process conducted without the urgency engendered by a dispute. 
 Parties opt to step outside conventional dispute resolution procedures. 
 One or both parties seek to depart from conventional adversarial engagement. 
 Less directive style of facilitation. 
 Conciliation may be provided and proposals may sometimes be presented to the 
parties. 
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 Deeper engagement than would be possible with conventional collective bargaining, 
facilitation or conciliation. 
 Facilitation process can encompass conciliation and possibly adjudication/ 
arbitration. 
 
Turning to the objectives of employers and unions in opting for facilitation and the 
outcomes they had achieved, there was a strong level of agreement between facilitators. 
Facilitators emphasized that the parties involved in assisted bargaining were mainly 
concerned with reaching agreement on substantive or concrete issues. Process or 
relational outcomes, like changes in underlying relationships between the parties, were 
not common objectives. Sometimes assisted bargaining was seen nevertheless to have 
deepened levels of engagement between the parties involved and, in this way, to have 
resulted in improvements in the underlying quality of employment relations. Where this 
had occurred, however, it was seen to have arisen as an offshoot of a process where more 
immediate and pragmatic objectives dominated. Even in those instances where 
facilitation had occurred against a background of a legacy of difficult or fractious 
industrial relations, the focus of the parties, as of the facilitator, was on substantive 
outcomes. Those providing facilitation sometimes highlighted this pattern by 
commenting that the process was generally ‘non-transformative in the sense of 
relationships’. Within the LRC there was an understanding that relationship issues were 
better handled by the agency’s Advisory Service, which assisted employers and unions to 
develop more professional and positive postures and more effective structures for the 
conduct of industrial relations.  
Overall assisted bargaining was judged as having often worked successfully. But it was 
not seen as a panacea. Facilitation might assist parties to find agreement on many issues 
and even to move away from adversarialism and ‘fire-fighting’ towards anticipating 
change and dealing with it in a less contentious manner. But the process had sometimes 
collapsed and disputes had resulted, especially where complex restructuring programmes 
had been at issue. In those circumstances unresolved issues could be dealt with through 
conventional dispute resolution procedures and especially through conventional 
conciliation. So the process even if not successful might nevertheless still provide an 
‘orderly path to an industrial dispute that is then amenable to resolution through 
conventional dispute resolution mechanisms’. The process could also educate the parties 
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involved, providing them with a deeper understanding of the issues being addressed and a 
better appreciation of the concerns of their interlocutors. Where the process had 
terminated in a dispute, it might have narrowed down the issues requiring conciliation or 
adjudication.  
LRC facilitators anticipated that there would be a growing demand for this mode of 
conflict resolution. In part this was understood to reflect a growing practice among firms 
to choose third parties with the expertise to respond to the specific types of challenges 
they faced. This in turn was seen as one aspect of a more general trend among employers 
to pay for services on a ‘need to’ basis. It was observed that rather than paying fees to an 
employers’ association to avail of the services of an assigned case officer in the event of 
a problem or dispute arising, firms now seemed more intent on using their resources to 
‘buy the best in the business’ as the need arose. By proceeding in this manner firms also 
gained more control over the manner in which issues were handled. 
Conclusions 
It is a longstanding axiom of conflict resolution that third parties ought to assist with the 
search for agreement only after the parties directly involved became deadlocked and 
registered a failure to agree. Third-party involvement in assisted bargaining stands this 
principle on its head by bringing third parties in at the start or early on with a view to 
helping employers and unions to avoid deadlock, gain deeper engagement and reach 
agreement without becoming involved in a formal dispute.  
Within the LRC, assisted bargaining comprises one of several modes of facilitation. 
While the LRC’s work in assisting the parties to collective bargaining outside of dispute 
situations draws heavily on classical conciliation skills and techniques, these skills are 
nevertheless transposed in important ways. Third parties work in a less directive manner 
and facilitation has a longer-term focus than commonly arises in conciliation. Irrespective 
of the core skills and methods deployed, facilitation in assisted bargaining generally 
operates through plenary and side conferences, prioritizing plenary or joint sessions more 
than would be typical in conciliation. Informal soundings and formal and informal 
meetings with principals are conducted to explore problems and identify avenues to 
settlement. Documents may be drafted to record areas of agreement, possibly ‘without 
prejudice’ to the eventual positions of the parties.  
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Facilitation can involve informal and formal conciliation initiatives. In the LRC, 
facilitation cases have sometimes included formal conciliation conferences, conducted by 
different officers to those involved in assisting the parties to collective bargaining.  
The complex and blurred relationships between the processes of facilitation, conciliation 
and adjudication in assisted bargaining extend to the complex sequences in which these 
processes may progress. In some instances facilitation triggers conciliation and proceeds 
onward to adjudication. In other instances, requests for conciliation may trigger 
facilitation, possibly combining formal conciliation efforts and leading onwards to 
adjudication. 
Irrespective of the primary methods adopted or the sequencing of different processes, the 
primary purpose of assisted bargaining is to deepen engagement and make the process of 
collective bargaining more effective than when conducted directly between employers 
and unions, supported by conventional dispute resolution procedures. While assisted 
bargaining initiatives sometimes end in failure and even in disputes and work stoppages, 
the general view of facilitators is that the process was effective in helping employers and 
unions to gain a deeper understanding of both their interlocutors’ and their own interests 
and thereby to reach agreement. Those involved in facilitation were unanimous in the 
belief that the primary objective of employers and unions in undertaking facilitation was 
to reach agreement on concrete issues that often arose in the context of complex change 
programmes. Relational outcomes, such as ongoing improvements in industrial relations, 
where they arose, were seen as beneficial but usually unintended consequences of a 
process with more immediate and prosaic objectives. 
Assisted bargaining was triggered by a series of influences. Complex change and 
restructuring programmes were commonly identified as important influences. 
Intrinsically difficult issues, like changes in payment systems and working-time 
arrangements, or proposals for the use of outsourcing, also triggered assisted bargaining. 
The resolve of parties to step outside established disputes procedures to explore ways 
forward could also be an influence. The predominant view of these interviewed was that 
the use of facilitation to assist employers and unions engaged in collective bargaining had 
grown and would continue to grow over the medium to long term.  
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